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A
t the May 2004 meeting, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) introduced the phrase “policy
accommodation can be removed at a pace that is
likely to be measured” into the statement it makes at the
conclusion of each meeting. The “measured pace” language,
which was repeated in the next 12 statements, became widely
regarded as a signal that the FOMC would raise the funds rate
target by 25 basis points at its next meeting. This language
was modified at the December 2005 meeting and discontin-
ued at this year’s January meeting. Now that that experience
is over, it is useful to consider the extent to which policy-
makers should signal their next policy action.
The “measured pace” language appears to be a product
of the economic conditions that accompanied it. Beginning
in January 2001, on evidence that the economy was weaken-
ing and that inflation was contained, the FOMC began to ease
policy: The Committee reduced the federal funds target from
6.5 percent to 1.75 percent in 2001 and again in 2002 and
2003 to the historically low level of 1 percent. The 1 percent
rate was well below anyone’s estimate of the so-called
“neutral” nominal rate—the real interest rate (which is inde-
pendent of monetary policy) plus the FOMC’s implicit objec-
tive for inflation. It was understood that a 1 percent funds rate
was not sustainable. Faced with strong productivity growth
and no evidence of deteriorating inflation expectations, the
FOMC decided to increase the target at a “measured pace.” 
While signaling the timing and magnitude of the next
funds rate target change appears to have been useful under
these unusual circumstances, it is unlikely to be useful in
others, particularly when the difference between the target
and estimated neutral rates is relatively small. The neutral
nominal rate changes over time and is subject to considerable
uncertainty. Consequently, it is difficult to determine or pre-
dict; furthermore, in circumstances where the difference
between the target and estimated neutral rates is smaller than
it has been in recent years, policymakers may be uncertain
whether the target will need to be increased, decreased, or
maintained at the next meeting. Indeed, it is not surprising
that the measured pace language was phased out when the
target rate got closer to a level that some analysts considered
“neutral.”
Signaling the policy action at the next meeting is further
complicated by the fact that the current level of the policy rate
incorporates policymakers’ best guess of the future state of
the economy. Even if policymakers’expectations are correct on
average, what will occur by the time of any particular meeting
is not perfectly forecastable. This could make policymakers
understandably reluctant to decide on the action they’ll take
at the next meeting before they receive information about the
accuracy of their current expectations.
There may be situations where policymakers believe they
can achieve a particular objective by increasing or decreasing
the funds rate by x percentage points over a period of time and,
thereby, signal the direction and magnitude of the policy action
at the next meeting. For example, fearing recession, policy-
makers might believe that the target may be reduced slowly by
some cumulative amount. In such a circumstance, the direction
of the next move might be predictable, but the magnitude would
likely be less so. Moreover, the further the target gets below the
estimated neutral rate, the more wary policymakers will be of
signaling a reduction at the next meeting, preferring instead to
examine the behavior of inflation indicators between meetings
before deciding whether a further reduction is advisable.
That the FOMC may find it difficult, and consequently
unadvisable, to signal the next policy action does not prevent
the Committee from providing “forward guidance”—a statement
of the Committee’s thinking based on the information available
at the time of the meeting and the Committee’s expectation of
what might happen. Forward guidance is not a commitment.
The Committee would act in accordance with its forward
guidance only if the Committee’s expectation of what might
happen actually occurred. Indeed, as argued in Poole (1999),
transparency of this sort likely enhances the efficacy of mone-
tary policy.
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